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Abstract: 
Economic theory provides clear suggestions in fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
dilemma in fighting high inflation pressures. However, relative diversity in exchange rate 
regimes in the European transition economies revealed uncertain and spurious conclusions 
about the exchange rate regime choice during last two decades. Moreover, eurozone 
membership perspective (de jure pegging to euro) realizes uncertain consequences of 
exchange rate regime switching especially in the group of large floaters. Successful anti-
inflationary policy associated with stabilization of inflation expectations in the European 
transition economies at the end of 1990s significantly increased the role of short-term interest 
rates in the monetary policy strategies. At the same time, so called qualitative approach to 
the monetary policy decision-making performed in the low inflation environment, gradually 
enhanced the role of real interest rates expectations in the process of nominal interest rates 
determination. However, economic crisis increased uncertainty on the markets and thus 
worsen expectations of agents. 
In the paper we analyze sources of nominal interest rates volatility in ten European 
transition by estimating the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model. Variance 
decomposition and impulse-response functions are computed to estimate the relative 
contribution of inflation expectations and expected real exchange rates to the conditional 
variability of short-term money market interest rates as well as responses of nominal interest 
rates to one standard deviation inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks. 
Effects of economic crisis are considered by estimation of two models for every single 
economy from the group of the European transition economies using data for time periods 
2000-2007 and 2000-2011.  
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1. Introduction 
Macroeconomic stability, fast recovery from deep and sudden transition shock and real 
output growth stimulation represents one of the most challenging objectives for the European 
transition economies in the early 1990s. Consistent choice as well as flexible adjustments of 
monetary policy framework and exchange rate regime accompanied key crucial economic 
policy decisions in this process. Associated changes in monetary-policy strategy reflected 
wide range of macroeconomic aspects underlying sustainability of appropriate exchange rate 
regime choice. 
Among key determinants of the exchange rate regime choice in the European transition 
economies at the beginning of the 1990s we may consider an effort to regain macroeconomic 
stability, foreign exchange reserves requirements and availability, overall external economic 
(trade and financial) openness, etc. At the later stages of transition process we emphasize the 
role of massive foreign capital inflows, sustainability of real economic growth, institutional 
adjustments according to perspectives of ERM2 entry. 
Initial transition shock followed by the sharp real output decline associated with 
intensive inflation pressures (caused by rapid exchange rate devaluations, price liberalization 
and deregulation, tax reforms, fiscal imbalances, etc.) emphasized a crucial importance of 
strong nominal anchor for monetary authorities in restoring a macroeconomic stability and 
confidence as well as positive expectations of economic agents. However immediate 
exchange rate based stabilization became an appropriate strategy only for countries with 
adequate foreign exchange reserves while being able to significantly reduce inflation 
pressures in adequate (short) time period to prevent undesired rapid overvaluation. As a result 
it seems to be convenient to divide the European transition economies in two groups (so 
called “peggers” and “floaters”) considering initial exchange rate regime framework. 
Economic theory provides clear suggestions in fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
dilemma in fighting high inflation pressures. However, relative diversity in exchange rate 
regimes in the European transition economies revealed uncertain and spurious conclusions 
about the exchange rate regime choice during last two decades. Moreover, eurozone 
membership perspective (de jure pegging to euro) realizes uncertain consequences of 
exchange rate regime switching especially in the group of large floaters. 
Successful anti-inflationary policy associated with stabilization of inflation expectations 
in the European transition economies at the end of 1990s significantly increased the role of 
short-term interest rates in the monetary policy strategies. At the same time, so called 
qualitative approach to the monetary policy decision-making performed in the low inflation 
environment, gradually enhanced the role of real interest rates expectations in the process of 
nominal interest rates determination. However, economic crisis increased uncertainty on the 
markets and thus worsen expectations (inflation expectations including) of agents. 
Eurozone member countries as well as global economy are currently exposed to the 
negative effects of the financial and economy crisis. To alleviate recession and support 
economic recovery, monetary authorities dramatically reduced key interest rates. Low interest 
rates together with quantitative easing, however, should not necessarily increase supply of 
loans due to prudential credit policy of commercial banks reflecting increased uncertainty on 
the markets. As a result, policy of low interest rates seems to be inefficient. 
In the paper we analyze sources of nominal interest rates volatility in ten European 
transition economies to identify the impact of inflation expectations and expected real interest 
rates on the nominal interest rates volatility by estimating the structural vector autoregression 
(SVAR) model. From constructed model we estimate the relative contribution of both 
determinants to the conditional variability (variance decomposition) of short-term money 
market interest rates. At the same time we estimate responses (impulse-response functions) of 
short-term nominal money market interest rates to one standard deviation inflation 
expectations and expected real interest rates shocks. Effects of economic crisis on our results 
are considered by estimating two models for every single economy from the group of the 
European transition economies employing monthly data for two different time periods 2000-
2007 and 2000-2011. Comparison of results for both models is crucial for analysis the 
economic crisis contribution to the nominal interest rates volatility in ten European transition 
economies. 
 
2. Overview of Exchange Rate Regime Evolution in the European Transition Economies 
Exchange rate policy evolution represents one of the key parts of crucial economic 
policy decisions at the beginning of the transition process in countries from the region of 
Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Despite its complexity and particularity there 
seems to be some similar features at the starting point of transition process in all European 
transition economies such as recession followed by initial transition shock and common 
vision of European union and Economic and Monetary union membership. 
Table 1 Exchange Rate Regimes in the European Transition Economies 
 
 exchange rate regime 
Bulgaria  managed floating currency board 
Czech 
Republic peg with horizontal bands  managed floating 
Estonia  currency board  ERM2 eurozone
Hungary adjustable peg crawling peg  peg with horizontal bands    managed floating
Latvia   floating conventional fixed peg  ERM2 
Lithuania   floating currency board  ERM2 
Poland     crawling peg  free floating 
Romania free floating managed floating 
Slovak 
Republic peg with horizontal bands managed floating  ERM2 eurozone 
Slovenia  managed floating crawling band  ERM2 eurozone 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Note: Exchange rate regime evolution in the European transition economies: Bulgaria - since 1991 floating 
(pegged exchange rate regime undesirable due to possible low credibility), currency board since 1997 (after 
1996-1997financial crisis (public debt, bad commercial banks loans)). Czech Republic - exchange rate pegged to 
currency basket with narrow but continuously widen horizontal bands, since May 1997 after currency attacks 
switch to managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate with DEM (EUR) as reference 
currency. Estonia - currency board since 1992 till 2011 (euro adoption), plan to adopt in 2008 but delayed due 
high inflation, since 2011 eurozone membership. Hungary - managed floating till February 1995, since March 
1995 till the end of 1999 crawling peg with continuously decreased rate of periodical devaluation and widen 
horizontal bands, since January 2000  exchange rate pegged to euro combined with wide horizontal bands (since 
May 2001), since May 2008 managed floating with EUR as reference currency. Latvia - since February 1994 
exchange rate pegged to SDR (fixing the exchange rate to a basket of currencies (SDR) instead of a single 
currency serves to promote long-term stability) (since January 2005 pegged to EUR). Lithuania - since April 
1994 currency board (exchange rate pegged to USD, in February 2002 pegging switched to EUR). Poland - since 
the end of 1991 crawling peg with continuously decreased rate of periodical devaluation and widen horizontal 
bands, since April 2000 free floating. Romania - free floating, since 1998 exchange rate arrangement reclassified 
as managed floating. Slovak Republic - exchange rate pegged to currency basket with narrow but continuously 
widen horizontal bands, since October 1998 after currency attacks switch to managed floating with no 
predetermined path for the exchange rate with DEM (EUR) as reference currency, since 2009 eurozone 
membership. Slovenia - managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate (since February 
2002 crawling band - the monetary authority manages the float of the domestic currency within certain 
fluctuating margins around a depreciating path - a heavily-managed crawling band with pragmatic monetary, 
real, external and financial indicators). 
ERM2 - June 2004 - Estonia (left in January 2011 after euro adoption), Lithuania, Slovenia (left in January 
2007 after euro adoption) 
    - May 2005 - Latvia 
    - November 2005 - Slovak Republic (left in January 2009 after euro adoption) 
.Source: IMF AREAER 1990-2011, author’s processing. 
 
Macroeconomic stability as one of the primary objectives in the initial phase of the 
transition process affected exchange rate regime choice in the European transition economies. 
However, low credibility of monetary institutions, lack of foreign exchange reserves and high 
inflation differentials represented real constraints and difficulties related to the sustainability 
of pegged exchange rate regimes. Brief overview of the exchange rate regimes evolution in 
the European transition economies provides table 1. 
It seems to be clear that the European transition economies did not follow common 
practice in the process of the exchange rate regime choice at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Small Baltic countries adopted currency board regime (Estonia and Lithuania) eventually 
conventional fixed peg regime (Latvia). Hungary adopted crawling peg regime (after few 
years of adjustable peg in place) together with Poland. Czech Republic and Slovak Republic 
adopted pegged regime with horizontal bands. Despite high inflation rates Bulgaria, Romania 
and Slovenia adopted floating exchange rate regime due to low level of reserves and lack of 
credibility though Bulgaria switched to currency board after 1996-97 financial crisis. It seems 
to be clear that most of the European transition economies enjoyed disinflationary and 
credibility benefits of so called hard or soft exchange rate regimes. Fixed exchange rates as 
the nominal anchor significantly contributed to the successful disinflationary process at the 
end of the 1990s. 
Till the end of the decade many countries from the group switched to more flexible 
exchange rate regimes (Czech Republic in 1997, Slovak Republic in 1998 and Poland in 
2000). Similarly Hungary switched to intermediate regime by widening horizontal bands. 
Although Hungary stacked to exchange rate pegged to euro, by employing wide horizontal 
bands de facto followed the same trend as previous group of countries. 
Exchange rate regime choice also affected corresponding monetary policy strategy 
framework. Countries with exchange rate as nominal anchor (hard pegs or soft pegs with 
narrow horizontal bands) successfully implemented exchange rage targeting. Countries with 
soft pegs (pegs with wide horizontal bands or crawling pegs) and floating regimes employed 
monetary targets as intermediate criteria of monetary policy (monetary targeting). 
Overall success of disinflationary process represents one of the key milestones on the 
road to stable macroeconomic environment with crucial role of low and stable inflation 
expectations. Low inflation combined with stable inflation expectations is considered to be a 
substantial condition for switching from quantitative (money supply) to qualitative (interest 
rates) approach in monetary policy decision-making. This adjustment in monetary policy 
strategies seems to be obvious in the European transition economies since the end of 1990s as 
a part of prevailing trend in weakening of relationship between money and inflation. 
Increased role of inflation expectations together with raising credibility of monetary 
authorities resulted in adoption of direct (explicit) inflation targeting strategy in many 
European transition economies - Czech Republic (1998), Poland (1999), Hungary (2001), 
Slovenia (2002), Romania (2005) and Slovak Republic (2005).  
European transition economies challenged a decision of a euro adoption and eurozone 
membership several years before the economic crisis arises. Disputable policy implications of 
sacrificing monetary sovereignty rose as a crucial assumption affecting main features as well 
as durability of preparation phase timetable in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes 
(Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia). Among a variety of 
determinants and aspects we emphasize the role of decisions inevitably associated with 
“right” scheduling of the eurozone entry. Some countries from the group of the European 
transition economies already joined the eurozone (Estonia (2011), Slovak Republic (2009), 
Slovenia (2007)) followed by participation of their currencies in ERM2 (Estonia (June 2004), 
Slovak Republic (November 2005), Slovenia (June 2004)). On the other hand currencies of 
Lithuania and Latvia are still participating on ERM2. 
The loss from sacrificing exchange rates flexibility in the eurozone candidate countries 
became directly confronted with benefits related to exchange rate stability associated with 
sacrificing monetary autonomy. Despite plausible advantages of pegging exchange rates of 
candidate countries to euro followed by the euro adoption it seems to be clear that risks 
associated with potential effects of breakdown in mutual interconnections between 
macroeconomic development and flexible exchange rates leading path seem to be of a minor 
interest in current empirical literature. 
 
3. Overview of the Literature 
Obvious trend in the exchange rate regimes development and low inflation 
environment, together with increased sensitivity of commercial banks to the interest rates 
development in the European transition countries in the pre-crisis period during the last 
decade, enabled monetary authorities to successfully harmonize national monetary policy 
frameworks with eurozone legal and operative pillars. Exchange rates stability during the 
preparation phase on the road to euro adoption was clearly associated with capabilities of 
national monetary authorities to maintain a monetary stability via interest rates transmission 
channel. 
Gradual transition toward implementation of the qualitative approach mechanisms to 
the monetary policy decision-making in the European transition economies significantly 
increased the role of short-term interest rates adjustments. Operative fine-tuning of money 
market interest rates provides crucial information for commercial banks about intentions of 
monetary authority and thus enhancing signal function of key interest rates. However, desired 
effects of interest rate changes may be weaken especially in non-stable inflation environment. 
Sudden inflation shifts may cause misleading interpretation of interest rates adjustments and 
thus provide spurious signals to agents. 
Linkage between inflation and nominal interest rates seems to be well observed. There 
is a strong interconnection in development of both categories. Traditional channel of impulses 
transmission provides clear suggestion about causal relationship between inflation and 
nominal interest rates - changes in the rate of inflation forces changes in the nominal interest 
rates due to changes in inflation premium. Following this assumption, central banks raises 
interest rates as the response to the inflation increase (this practice is known as monetary 
policy rule), trying to stabilize (maintain) purchasing power of the money. On the other hand, 
inflation increase doesn’t necessarily reflect unreasonably fast economic growth signalizing 
overheating. In such a case, increased interest rates should not contribute to the inflation drop. 
Therefore, raising inflation is not necessarily associated with fast economic growth, but may 
be a result of market failures or exogenous shocks and thus affect economies even in the 
recession or stagnation. 
Nominal interest rates are not necessarily determined just by the rate of inflation. It is 
due fact that nominal interest rates consists of two components - real value of money and 
inflation premium. As a result, changes in nominal interest rates may be caused not only by 
forces determining the rate of inflation, but also by a number of variables affecting real 
interest rates (expectations of agents included). Nominal price of money is determined by a 
wide variety of determinants, that is why it may not seem to be clear, whether nominal 
interest rates volatility is caused by changes in inflation expectations or expected real interest 
rates. Correct identification of (especially short-term) nominal interest rates volatility seems 
to be a crucial aspect for successful monetary policy decision-making. For example, an 
increase in the nominal interest rates caused by higher inflation expectations of agents 
represents a right signal for monetary policy tightening. Corresponding increase in the rate of 
interest seems to be well suited decision for reduction of excessive inflation pressures. On the 
other hand, an increase in the nominal interest rates caused by higher expected real interest 
rates is usually associated with different monetary policy consequences. 
Inflation versus interest rates nexus seems to be widely discussed area in the empirical 
literature. St-Amant (St-Amant, 1996) employed bivariate SVAR model to analyze the impact 
of expected inflation and ex-ante real interest rates on the nominal interest rates volatility of 
government bonds with maturity one year and ten years in the U.S.A. Following author’s 
results we may conclude that inflation expectations seems to prevailing determinant of 
nominal interest rate volatility since the beginning of 1970s till the middle of 1980s, whereas 
shifts in expected real interest rates substantially contributed to the nominal interest rates 
volatility during the first half of the 1990s. Deacon a Derry (Deacon a Derry, 1994) provided 
a variety of methods for identification of market interest rate and inflation premium from the 
interest rates associated with government bonds. Engsted (Engsted, 1995) implemented 
cointegration analysis and VAR methodology to examine properties of interest rates and 
inflation time series. Neely a Rapach (Neely a Rapach, 2008) analyzed time series for real 
interest rates employing growth equilibrium model. Authors dedicated extra effort to 
investigate a presence of persistence patterns especially in medium and long time period. 
Ragan (Ragan, 1995) analyzed time structure of nominal interest rates to estimate inflation 
expectations of agents. Results of his empirical investigation provided interpretation of the 
real interest rate volatility over time. Crowder a Hoffman (Crowder a Hoffman, 1996) 
analyzed mutual interconnections between inflation and interest rates. Implemented SVAR 
methodology helped authors to isolate permanent and temporary sources of volatility for 
nominal interest rates and inflation time series. Lai (Lai, 2004) examined properties of time 
series for real interest rates. Author investigated conditions to maintain a time series 
stacionarity under changing length of base period. Garcia a Perron (Garcia a Perron, 1996) 
analyzed long-run features of time series for real interest rates in the U.S.A. Lanne (Lanne, 
2002) verified a validity of Fisher effect following the results of lung-run interconnections 
testing between inflation and nominal interest rates in the U.S.A.  
 
4. Econometric model 
Employed methodology to analyze sources of nominal interest rates volatility is based 
on technique pioneered by Blanchard a Quah (Blanchard - Quah, 1988) who estimated 
bivariate model with two types of exogenous shocks. To identify structural shocks authors 
implemented identification scheme based on decomposing effects of the shocks into 
permanent and transitory components. Long-run identifying restrictions were applied on the 
variance-covariance matrix of reduced form VAR residuals. 
Following our objective we estimate a model consisting of the vector of endogenous 
variables Xt and the same number of primitive (structural) shocks. Unrestricted form of the 
model is represented by the following infinite moving average representation: 
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where tX  is a vector of the endogenous macroeconomic variables, iA  is a polynomial 
variance-covariance matrix of lag-length l, L is lag operator and   is a vector of identically 
normally distributed, serially uncorrelated and mutually orthogonal white noise disturbances 
(vector of reduced form shocks in elements of X). Vector tX  of the endogenous variables of 
the model  , ,  n t tt ir pX     consists of the following two elements: nominal interest rates 
 ,n tir  and rate of inflation  tp . Vector t  of the past primitive shocks is represented by the 
following two shocks: inflation expectations shock  ,ep t  and expected real interest rates 
shock  ,rir t . 
The structural exogenous shocks from equation (1) are not directly observable (cannot 
be correctly identified) due to the complexity of information included in true form VAR 
residuals. As a result structural shocks cannot by correctly identified. It is necessary to 
transform true model into following reduced form  
 
-1 -1 2 -2
0 0
        ...     it t ti t i it t
i i
X e C e C e C e C L e
 
 
          (3) 
or 
 
  ,, 11 12
21 22 ,
 = 
e
e
r
i tn t i i
t i i ir t
uc cir
c c up
              
     (4) 
 
From equations (1) and (3) we clearly observe relationship between primitive shocks t  
and reduced form VAR residuals te : 
 
  0= t te A        (5) 
 
Matrices iC  we obtain from estimated equation (1). Considering 0 = i iA C A , we can 
now identify matrix 0A . To estimate coefficient of matrix 0A , it is necessary to impose four 
restrictions. Two restrictions are simple normalizations, which define the variance of the 
shocks 
,ep t
  and ,rir t  (it follows the assumption that each of the disturbances has a unit 
variance,  var  = 1 ). Third restriction comes from an assumption that identified shocks are 
orthogonal. Normalization together with an assumption of the orthogonality implies 
'
0 0  = A A  , where   is the variance covariance matrix of ,ep te  and ,rir te . The final 
restriction, which allows the matrix C to be uniquely defined, represents the long-run 
identifying restriction providing that a cumulative effect of expected real interest rate shock to 
the nominal interest rates variability is zero: 
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Long-run identifying restrictions enable us to isolate temporary and permanent sources 
of nominal interest rates volatility and thus to distinguish effects of both structural shocks on 
endogenous variables of the model. 
In terms of our vector autoregression model it implies 
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Correctly identified model can be finally estimated employing SVAR methodology. 
Variance decomposition and impulse-response functions are computed to observe a relative 
contribution of inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks to the nominal 
interest rates conditional variance as well as response of nominal interest rates to one standard 
deviation inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks. Effects of economic 
crisis on our results are considered by estimation of two models (with data sets for two 
different time periods 2000-2007 (model A) and 2000-2011 (model B)) for every country 
from the group of the European transition economies. Comparison of results for both models 
is crucial for evaluation of the economic crisis contribution to the nominal interest rates 
volatility in ten European transition economies. 
 
5. Data and Results 
To estimate a sources of the nominal interest rates volatility in ten European transition 
economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia) we employ monthly data with period 2000M1-2007M12 (model 
A) consisting of 96 observations and with period 2000M1-2011M12 (model B) consisting of 
144 observations for following endogenous variables - nominal interest rates (interbank 
offered rates with 3 months maturity1) and inflation (core inflation). Estimation of two models 
corresponds with the primary objective of the paper that is to evaluate effects of inflation 
expectations and estimated real interest rates on nominal interest rates development 
considering possible implications of economic crisis on presented results. Time series for all 
endogenous variables were drawn from IMF database (International Financial Statistics, 
November 2012). Time series for the rate of inflation were seasonally adjusted. 
We also emphasize a relative importance of exchange rate regime choice on the results 
providing suggestion about potential effects of breakdown in mutual interconnections 
between macroeconomic development and flexible exchange rates leading path (as one of the 
key implications after euro adoption). The beginning of the period for time series included in 
both models is related the continuous strengthening of qualitative features in the monetary 
policy decision-making since the beginning of the past decade. 
Correct estimation of both models and precise identification of exogenous shocks 
hitting the model it is necessary VAR model to be stationary. To test the stationarity of both 
models it is necessary to test the time series for unit roots and cointegration. To test the 
stability of the VAR model we have also applied a number of diagnostic tests of the VAR 
residuals (normality, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity). 
 
Overview of interest rates and inflation development in the European transition 
economies provides figure 1. As we have expected, most countries experienced obvious trend 
in inflation decrease during the first half of the past decade. Adverse impacts of external (oil 
and gas markets) and internal (seasonal food, indirect taxes) price development together with 
spurious price effects of euro adoption (in respective countries) and economic crisis 
contributed to ceasing or slowing down of positive inflation trend in most of countries from 
the group. On the other hand interest rate development seems to be affected by exchange rate 
regime choice. Countries with currency board arrangements (Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania) 
and conventional fixed peg (Latvia) experienced relatively stable trend in the interest rates 
development during the pre-crisis period. In countries with flexible exchange rate 
                                                          
1 Interbank offered rates in Estonia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia were replaced by EURIBOR since the 
eurozone membership. 
arrangements2 interest rates seem to be much more determined by main trends in the 
development of inflation. 
In both groups of countries interest rates did not precisely follow a leading path of 
inflation. At the same time, adjustments in interest rates seem to be lagged following changes 
in inflation with up 6 month delay. Countries with hard pegs also experiences repetitive 
periods with negative real interest rates in the recent years due to excessive inflation 
pressures. 
 
Figure 1 Interest Rates and Inflation (2000M1-2011M12) 
 
 
 
Note: Endogenous variables - inflation (CPI), short-term interest rates (IR) are expressed in percentage. 
Source: Compiled by author based on data taken from IMF - International Financial Statistics (November 2012). 
 
Crises period affected interest rates and inflation in all countries. Inflation rates in all 
ten European transition economies reached its local maximum (for the period of last few 
years) shortly before negative effects of ongoing economic crisis revealed. Although the rate 
of inflation seems to differ at the end of pre-crisis period in each individual country, all 
economies subsequently experienced rapid disinflation as a result of recession. In all countries 
interest rates adapted to changes in inflation with just moderate intensity causing high 
volatility and instability of real exchange rates. Moreover, Hungary experienced the period of 
asymmetric development of inflation and interest rates leading path. Strong divergence effect 
in Hungary was associated with sharp increase in real interest rates emphasizing crisis related 
internal and external macroeconomic imbalance in the country. 
 
A. Correlation Analysis 
Mutual relationship between inflation and interest rates in the European transition 
economies during the pre-crisis period depicts figure 2. Coefficients of correlation between 
                                                          
2 Although Hungary employed fixed exchange rate pegged to euro till May 2008, due to wide horizontal bands 
(?15%) exchange rate floated in de facto flexible exchange rate arrangement. 
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core inflation and short-term interest rates revealed plausible implications of exchange rate 
regime choice. In the group of countries so called “peggers” (countries with currency board 
arrangement or conventional fixed peg with narrow horizontal bands) the coefficients of 
correlation between inflation and interest rates seem to be lower (in some cases even much 
lower) than in the group of countries so called “floaters” (countries with free or managed 
floating or intermediate pegs).  
 
Figure 2 Inflation and Interest rates Correlation Coefficients (2000M1-2007M12) 
 
 
 
Note: Endogenous variables - inflation (CPI), short-term interest rates (IR) are expressed in percentage. 
Correlation coefficients between inflation and interest rates: BG (0.310), CZ (0.715), EE (0.556), HU (0.700), 
LT (0.428), LV (0.235), PL (0.825), RO (0.957), SI (0.864), SK (0.595).  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Following the results of correlation analysis we may conclude that in countries with 
exchange rate as the nominal anchor, non-autonomous monetary policy is obviously 
associated with low interest rates (irrespective of inflation) while exchange rate target 
contributes to successful disinflation process. On the other hand interest rates leading path 
doesn’t seem to be directly affected by domestic rate of inflation proving a substantial source 
of real exchange rate volatility. Even though, stabilized expectations of agents due to 
exchange rate targeting significantly contributes to the overall macroeconomic stability. 
Countries with inflation targeting and no predetermined path for the exchange rate 
achieved higher correlations between interest rates and inflation especially due to increased 
flexibility of short-term interest rates. In such countries, autonomous monetary policy 
obviously contributes to higher mutual interconnections between the rate of interest and the 
rate of inflation. Signal function of interest rates adjustments seems to be more significant and 
thus providing more precise information to agents about the price stability associated with the 
overall macroeconomic performance of the country.  
Mutual relationship between inflation and interest rates in the European transition 
economies during the extended period depicts figure 3. Coefficients of correlation between 
core inflation and short-term interest rates revealed curious effects of the crisis period. 
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Figure 3 Inflation and Interest rates Correlation Coefficients (2000M1-2011M12) 
 
 
 
Note: Endogenous variables - inflation (CPI), short-term interest rates (IR) are expressed in percentage. 
Correlation coefficients between inflation and interest rates: BG (0.621), CZ (0.677), EE (0.334), HU (0.616), 
LT (0.351), LV (0.404), PL (0.704), RO (0.955), SI (0.871), SK (0.714).  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Economic crisis significantly affected results of correlation analysis between inflation 
and interest rates. It seems that the strength of mutual interconnections between both 
categories weakened in most of countries from the group irrespective of the exchange rate 
arrangement. Increased uncertainty on the markets resulted in drop of information value 
resulted from associated changes in prices especially due to exogenous character of prices 
related initial determinants causing decreased efficiency of allocative efficiency of the 
markets. Lower predictability of inflation trend during the recession together with higher 
discretion in the monetary policy decision-making following the principle of low interest rate 
policy and quantitative easing that monetary authorities implemented to fight a crisis, 
contributed to higher volatility in the real exchange rates development in most of the countries 
from our group. The only exception in the group of “peggers” we found in two countries with 
currency board arrangements - Bulgaria and Lithuania and in the group of “floaters” - Slovak 
republic (country joined eurozone in 2009). 
Despite decreased interconnection between interest rates and inflation development 
during the extended period, coefficients of correlations between both categories remained, in 
general, higher in the group of “floaters”. Moreover, overall decrease in correlation 
coefficients doesn’t seem to be significant in this group of countries. Spurious effects of the 
crisis period seem to be more evident in the group of “peggers” considering much more 
significant changes in the coefficients of correlation between the rate of inflation and short-
term interest rates. 
Summarizing overview for correlation analysis of mutual relationship between inflation 
and interest rates in the European transition economies in the pre-crisis and extended period 
provides table 2. 
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Table 2 Summary of Correlation Analysis for Pre-crisis and Extended Period 
 
2000-2007 2000-2011 ∆ 
Bulgaria 0.310 0.621 ↑ 
Czech Republic 0.715 0.677 ↓ 
Estonia 0.556 0.334 ↓ 
Hungary 0.700 0.616 ↓ 
Latvia 0.428 0.351 ↓ 
Lithuania 0.235 0.404 ↑ 
Poland 0.825 0.704 ↓ 
Romania 0.957 0.955 = 
Slovak Republic 0.595 0.714 ↑ 
Slovenia 0.864 0.871 = 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
B. Unit Root Test 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were computed to test 
endogenous variables for the presence of a unit root. Results of unit root tests are summarized 
in the table 3 (detailed results of unit root are not reported here to save space. Like any other 
results, they are available upon request from the author). 
 
Table 3 Unit Root Tests 
 
Country 
M
od
el
 Order of integration of endogenous 
variables 
CPI IR 
ADF PP ADF PP 
Bulgaria 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Czech Republic 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Estonia 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Latvia 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Lithuania 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Hungary 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Poland 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
B I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) 
Romania 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Slovak Republic 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Slovenia 
A I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
B I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Both ADF and PP tests indicate that all variables are not stationary on the values so that 
the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for any of the series (with exception of 
interest rates in Hungary (ADF, model B) and inflation in Poland (PP, model B). Testing 
variables on the first differences indicates that the time series are stationary. Ve may conclude 
that all variables are I(1). 
 
C. Cointegration Test 
Because endogenous variables have a unit root on the values it is necessary to the test 
the time series for cointegration using the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test. The test 
for cointegration was calculated using three lags as recommended by AIC (Akaike 
Information Criterion) and SIC (Schwarz Information Criterion). Results of cointegration 
tests are summarized in the table 4 (detailed results of cointegration tests are not reported here 
to save space. Like any other results, they are available upon request from the author). 
The results of the Johansen cointegration tests confirmed the results of the unit root tests 
for both models (models A and B) in all ten countries providing that any linear combination 
of two variables is nonstationary process. Trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics 
(both at 0.05 level) in each individual country indicated that there is no cointegration among 
endogenous variables of both models.  
 
Table 4 Johansen and Juselius Cointegration Tests 
 
Country 
Number of cointegrating equations 
Model A Model B 
trace 
stat. 
max 
eigvalue 
stat. 
trace 
stat. 
max 
eigvalue 
stat. 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
D. VAR Stability 
To test the stability of VAR model we also applied a number of diagnostic tests. We 
found no evidence of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity effect in the disturbances. Model also passed the Jarque-Bera normality 
test, so that errors seem to be normally distributed. VAR models seem to be also stable 
because inverted roots of the model for each country lie inside the unit circle (figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 VAR Stability Condition Check 
 
Model A 
 
 
 
Model B 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Following results of the unit root and cointegration tests we estimated both models 
using variables in the first differences so that we can calculate variance decompositions and 
impulse-response functions for all ten countries from the group of the European transition 
economies. Following the main objective of the paper we summarize the relative importance 
of inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks in the nominal interest rates 
conditional variance. We also analyze individual responses of nominal interest rates to the 
positive one standard deviation inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks. 
Effects of the crisis period on sources of the nominal interest rates volatility in the European 
transition economies is observed by comparing the results for estimated models employing 
time series for two different periods - model A (2000M1-2007M12) and model B (2000M1-
2011M12). 
 
 
 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Bulgaria, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Czech republic, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Estonia, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Hungary, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Lithuania, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Latvia, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Poland, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Romania, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Slovenia, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Slovak republic, model A)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Bulgaria, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Czech republic, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Estonia, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Hungary, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Lithuania, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Latvia, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Poland, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Romania, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Slovenia, model B)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
(Slovak republic, model B)
E. Variance Decomposition 
Figure 5 shows the estimated contribution of inflation expectations and expected real 
interest rates shocks to nominal interest rates conditional variance in the European transition 
economies during the pre-crisis period (2000M1-2007M12) in model A. 
 
Figure 5 Variance Decomposition of Nominal Interest Rates (2000M1-2007M12) 
 
  
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Overview of structural shocks contributions to the nominal interest rates unpredicted 
shifts revealed remarkable implications of the exchange rate regime choice. Immediate 
contribution of the expected real interest rates shock is significantly higher in countries with 
currency board arrangement (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania) and conventional fixed peg 
(Latvia) though the size of initial contribution differs in all four economies. It seems like 
exchange rate as the nominal anchor contributes to the stability of inflation expectations 
(especially in the short-run). Exchange rate targeting thus provides a suitable vehicle for 
reducing short-run effects of inflation expectations on the price mechanism on the money 
market. Higher contribution of expected real interest rates to the nominal interest rates 
variance also reduces distorting effects of money markets imperfections resulting from false 
price signals related to sudden inflation shifts. It also seems to be obvious that the relative 
contribution of the expected real interest rates shock decreases over time followed by 
increasing role of the inflation expectations shock. 
The relative immediate importance of the expected real interest rates shock in the group 
of countries, so called floaters, seems to be significantly smaller reflecting crucial role of 
inflation expectations in determining the nominal interest rates leading path (with exception 
of Slovenia). Despite the absence of apparent nominal anchor (explicit exchange rate target 
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with no predetermined path for the exchange rate), explicit inflation targeting (monetary 
policy strategy implemented by all six countries with floating exchange rate regimes during 
the first half of the 2000s) delivered similarly successful results in disinflation process. Thus, 
a substantially higher role of the inflation expectations in this group of countries seems to be 
reasonable. The overall impact of inflation expectations on interest rates even rises in the 
long-run (with exception of Poland and Romania). 
 
Figure 6 shows the estimated contribution of inflation expectations and expected real 
interest rates shocks to the nominal interest rates conditional variance in the European 
transition economies during the extended period (2000M1-2011M12) in model B. 
 
Figure 6 Variance Decomposition of Nominal Interest Rates (2000M1-2011M12) 
 
  
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
In general, economic crisis predominately confirmed main character of identified 
potential sources determining the short-term nominal interest rates volatility in the European 
transition economies. In the group of countries, so called “peggers” we experienced an 
increased immediate contribution of expected real interest rates shock to the conditional 
variability of nominal interest rates. Even the price effects of economic crisis seem to be 
spurious and hardly predictable, immediate role of inflation expectations in determining 
nominal interest rates generally decreased in this group of countries. It seems that a credible 
nominal target operating as a key pillar of the monetary policy strategy provides a crucial 
anchor for stable inflation expectations of agents, especially in the short-run. 
In the group of countries, so called “floaters”, immediate contribution of inflation 
expectations shock to the nominal interest rates variance predominately increased (with 
exception of Poland and Romania in the short-run). Despite overall success of inflation 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Bulgaria, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Czech republic, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Estonia, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Hungary , model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Lithuania, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Latv ia, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Poland, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Romania, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Slov enia, model B)
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
inflation expectations shock
expected real interest rates shock
Variance Decomposition
(Slov ak republic, model B)
targeting we suggest that inflation expectations tend to suffer from low level of self-
persistence and become quite vulnerable to sudden changes caused by unexpected exogenous 
shocks. Related nominal interest rates volatility and associated real interest rates instability 
reflects relatively low success of monetary authority to regain price stability providing the 
absence of a credible nominal anchor. 
 
F. Impulse-Response Function 
In the figure 7 we summarize responses of nominal interest rates to one standard 
deviation positive inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks in the 
European transition economies during the pre-crisis period (2000M1-2007M12) in model A. 
 
Figure 7 Impulse-Response Functions of Nominal Interest Rates (2000M1-2007M12) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Nominal interest rates responded to both inflation expectations and expected real 
interest rates shocks during pre-crisis period in line with empirical expectations. One standard 
deviation positive shock of inflation expectations caused immediate increase in nominal 
interest rates in all ten European transition economies. On the other hand we observed some 
differences in intensity as well as durability of the effect. 
Immediate response of nominal interest rates to unpredicted sudden positive one 
standard deviation real interest rate shock in the group of countries, so called “peggers” as 
well as in Hungary, seems to be noticeably higher. Provided that Hungarian forint operated 
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during the pre-crisis period in the intermediate exchange rate regime3, similarity of results 
seems to be convenient. 
Effects of both shocks seem to be just temporary in determining short-time variability 
of nominal interest rates. Negative impact of inflations expectations and expected real interest 
rates shocks steadily died out confirming long-run neutrality of nominal interest rates to their 
effects. 
 
In the figure 8 we summarize responses of nominal interest rates to one standard 
deviation positive inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks in the 
European transition economies during the extended period (2000M1-2011M12) in model B. 
 
Figure 8 Impulse-Response Functions of Nominal Interest Rates (2000M1-2011M12) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Crisis period affected responses of nominal interest rates to positive inflation 
expectations and expected real interest rates shocks with spurious results. In three countries 
from the group of so called “peggers” (Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania) we experienced slight 
increase in the durability of the negative effect imposed by the inflation expectations shock. 
An exception in this group of countries is Estonia (anticipated eurozone membership might 
cause changes in effects of inflation expectations). At the same the negative effect of expected 
real interest rates shock seems to be durable in all countries of so called “peggers” with 
                                                          
3Hungarian forint operated during pre-crisis period in de facto fixed peg regime, but due to substantial range for 
fluctuations provided by wide horizontal bands it was included in the group of countries, so called “floaters”. 
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expectation of Bulgaria. At the same we experienced an increased durability of the expected 
real interest rates shock in Estonia and Latvia. 
Changes in effects of inflation expectations shock on the nominal interest rates during 
the extended period in the group of so called “floaters” seems to be just negligible. At the 
same time we experienced a slight increase in durability of expected real interest rates 
positive shock (especially in Czech Republic and Poland). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Exchange rate regime choice in the European transition economies affected 
corresponding monetary policy strategy framework. Countries (peggers) with exchange rate 
as the nominal anchor (hard pegs or soft pegs with narrow horizontal bands) successfully 
implemented exchange rage targeting. Countries (floaters) with soft pegs (pegs with wide 
horizontal bands or crawling pegs) and floating regimes employed monetary targets as 
intermediate criteria of monetary policy (monetary targeting) later (continuously since the end 
of the 1990 in respective countries) followed by adoption of direct (explicit) inflation 
targeting.  
Regular monetary policy anchors operates well as stabilizing pillars under turbulent 
conditions in domestic (open) economy considering relative stability on the markets of main 
trading partners as well as of the country providing nominal anchor (i.e. exchange rate). 
Following our results in the model with time series for pre-crisis period it seems that 
exchange rate as the nominal anchor contributed to the stability of inflation expectations in 
the group of countries, so called “peggers” (especially in the short-run). Exchange rate 
targeting thus provided a suitable vehicle for reduction of short-term effects of inflation 
expectations on the price mechanism on the money market. Higher contribution of expected 
real interest rates to the nominal interest rates conditional variance also reduced distorting 
effects of money markets imperfections resulting from false price signals related to sudden 
inflation shifts. 
Despite the absence of an apparent nominal anchor, explicit inflation targeting delivered 
similarly successful results in disinflation process in the group of countries, so called 
“floaters”. Substantially higher role of the inflation expectations in this group of countries 
seemed to be reasonable. The overall impact of inflation expectations on nominal interest 
rates in the long-run mostly rose. 
Overall effects of the crisis period related to the respective responses of nominal interest 
rates to the inflation expectations and expected real interest rates shocks seem to be puzzled. 
Redistributive impacts followed by increased asynchronous effects of local crisis are 
obviously associated with selective and irregular changes in expectations of agents though 
still well anchored by credible indicator. Economic crisis, as a typical exogenous shock and 
global phenomenon, affected economies especially through the external trade or/and financial 
flows channel, quickly spreading across a region of neighboring and interconnected 
economies. It seems to be convenient to expect that a relative importance of external nominal 
anchors during the crisis period became less successful in stabilizing inflation expectations, 
providing distorting effects of the crisis on the economy of anchoring country. However, our 
results indicates that a relative importance of inflation expectations in determining nominal 
interest rates generally decreased in the group of countries, so called “peggers”. Even the 
price effects of economic crisis seem to be spurious and hardly predictable, a credible nominal 
anchor provided a crucial vehicle for stabilization of inflation expectations of agents, causing 
a relative drop in the role of inflation expectations in determining nominal interest rates 
during the crisis period. 
Despite overall success of inflation targeting during the most of the 2000s we suggest 
that inflation expectations tend to suffer from low level of self-persistence and become quite 
vulnerable to sudden changes caused by unexpected exogenous shocks in the group of 
countries, so called “floaters”. Related nominal interest rates volatility and associated real 
interest rates instability reflected relatively low success of monetary authority to regain price 
stability proving the absence of a credible nominal anchor. 
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